WASHINGTON (Reuters) January 11,
2007 — Most Americans have lost hope and want to leave Iraq. Not
so George Bush. He is convinced that “victory” is not just
possible but essential, and that the Middle East can still be
refashioned by democracy.
On Wednesday, January 10th,
Bush
announced that he would send more than 20,000 extra troops to
Iraq, mostly to help Iraqi forces in their new campaign to
secure Baghdad. Some 4,000 of these troops are destined for the
violent western province of Anbar. American units will be
“embedded” within Iraqi formations to help them hold
neighborhoods wrested from armed groups. The new military effort
will be bolstered with economic, political and diplomatic
measures. American commanders and officials will be given
greater authority to spend money, a “reconstruction
co-coordinator” will be appointed in Baghdad and the Iraqi prime
minister, Nuri al-Maliki, will be held firmly to a set of
political “benchmarks."
Mr. Bush turned down bipartisan
calls to woo Iran and Syria. Instead, he accused those countries
of instigating the violence in Iraq. He confirmed the deployment
of an extra carrier strike group and Patriot anti-missile
batteries to the Middle East—a clear signal that he is not only
willing to raise the stakes in Iraq, but is also giving himself
the option of a military strike to halt Iran’s suspected quest
for nuclear weapons. Friendly Arab governments were told it was
in their own interests for America to succeed.
Reinforcing the American
presence now would break the cycle of violence and “hasten the
day our troops begin coming home” according to Mr. Bush. But he
acknowledged he had made “mistakes”, accepted that more
Americans were likely to die, and told his audience not to
expect a “surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship."
In deciding to redouble the war
effort, Mr. Bush now finds himself almost alone. General John
Abizaid, the head of Central Command that oversees American
strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, all but rejected the idea of a
“surge” of forces two months ago. He told a Senate hearing that
raising troop levels by 20,000 would have only a “temporary
effect” on security and would delay the day Iraqi forces could
take control. Mr.. Bush has always said he would defer to his
military commanders, but this time he did not take their advice.
Instead, he dismissed General Abizaid and reshuffled key figures
in his Iraq team.
Mr. Bush also ignored the
managed withdrawal advocated by the Iraq Study Group, a
bipartisan commission co-chaired by James Baker, a former
secretary of state. The strategy he plumped for was surge, an
idea proposed in a report by the American Enterprise Institute,
a hawkish think-tank. This called for an even bigger surge of
about 35,000 troops.
The critical terrain is
Baghdad: Iraq’s most populous city, with 6m inhabitants of all
sects. The Americans have long pursued an “oil-spot”
strategy—establishing areas of stability that would, with time,
expand. These tactics have had success in some areas,
particularly rural towns. In Baghdad, though, any calm is
short-lived. Last summer’s joint American-Iraqi operation,
codenamed “Together Forward”, was followed by the most vicious
round of killing yet seen in the city. With the promise of
substantially more troops the idea is that American forces will
not only clear neighborhoods of insurgents, but also stay behind
and make sure that economic development follows immediately.
More American troops may or may
not bring greater security. But they will offer more targets for
insurgents to shoot at, and reinforce many Iraqis’ resentment of
the occupation. More civilians could get killed, whether by
error, carelessness or worse.
The surge, then, may be too
small to make a decisive impact and yet too large for the
American armed forces to bear. The tempo of troop rotations in
Iraq and Afghanistan is already in breach of the Pentagon’s
guidelines. Equipment is being lost in battle or worn out much
faster than anticipated. A bigger army would help, but it will
take years to recruit and train new combat units.
Mr. Bush’s plan is to create
some “breathing space”, bring down the violence to a level that
the Iraqi security forces can manage and give them time to
become more proficient. But to work, the military campaign has
to be intimately bound up with economic and political progress.
The president’s “benchmarks”
for the Iraqi government—sharing oil revenues fairly, spending
$10 billion on reconstruction, holding provincial elections,
revising the federal constitution and the “de-Baathification”
process—are desirable. But they have mostly been heard before,
and Mr.. Maliki’s government has failed to achieve them. In any
case, big political issues may matter little to gunmen who are
often fighting to control the local market, petrol station or
street.